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ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on the hypothetical question:

Would American

railroads meet their obligation to provide freight service at
reasonable cost if no regulation restrictions were imposed?
Railroads were originally regarded as great industrial giants
spearheading the development of this country .

Wild West movies

depicted men driving a golden spike where the railroad from the West
met the railroad from the East.

This was pictured as a very exciting

and romantic time in our history.
However, there were too many abuses.

In 1887, the Congress

decided to control special rates, the pass system, rebates and
discrimination, and passed into law an act to regulate interstate
commerce.

Since that time, many laws were passed to protect the

public from the railroads' monopolistic power.

Admittedly, many of

these laws were too restrictive and railroads would suffer hard times
during the various enforcement periods.
In 1980, almost 100 years later, Congress decided that all the
railroad "robber barons" were gone and that the railroad industry
should be deregulated by passing of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 .
The purpose of this study is to determine if it is essential that
rai lroads be regulated in order to ensure public protection from
1

economic manipulation.
issue.

The railroads' economic survival is also an

Specifically, it is hypothesized that railroads should have

the same freedom t o set prices and conduct business in other ways
without regulation the same as any other American industry acting in
the best interest of the overall economy .
My research was compiled from historical data.

The results of

the study show the public suffering overwhelming abuses in the history
of railroads.

Al so, economic problems for highly leveraged railroads

are highlighted.

The conclusions are that regulating the amount a

railroad can charge for i ts services, assuring the public open access
to competing railroads and reinvestment criteria are all necessary to
ensure the protection of the public .
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION

Rai lroad Regulation

Railroad regulation has been with us since 1887 when the
Congress of the United States enacted the Interstate Commerce Act.
Since that time, many additional acts and/or laws have been passed
to protect the public from the power of the railroad industry of the
United States.
Railroads were not regulated at first.

In 1826, the first

railroad to haul freight in the country was built from Quincy,
Massachusetts to the Neponset River, a distance of about two and
three-quarter mil es and was built for private use (Knorst 1).
The first public use railroad was the Baltimore and Ohio
Railway which was 13 miles long and was opened in 1830.

Initially,

it was dri ve n by horses on rails and after an unsuccessful attempt
to power it with sai l s, a steam l ocomot ive was used . The first
steam engine for use on rails had been around since 1815 (8).
At the conclusion of the Civil War, the Union Paci fi c and
Central Pacific Railroads built a transcontinental railroad from
coast to coast which was compl eted in 1869.

By 1890 , railroads had

grown so quickly that they covered 93,296 miles.
1

By 1900, mil es had
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increased to 163,597, and to 429,883 miles by 1930. Today,
railroads operate about one-half that amount of track because of low
density (traffic volumes), which was created when trucks started to
take business away from the railroads in the 1940,s (8).
Railroad tracks and rail cars have been upgraded and can now
move 100-ton payload cars in trains over 100 cars in length.

This

is a big improvement from the 28-ton weight units of 1902, and even
the 56-ton weight limits of 1962 (9) .
The efficient movement of our products and goods, both in
domestic and foreign commerce, is critical to American
competitiveness.

The nation,s highways, waterways and rail networks

have important roles to play; indeed, healthy competition among them
exerts strong downward pressures on prices.

That is why today all

modes are virtually free of economic regulation.
History of Regulation

Whi l e growth and expansion was occurring, the public paid the
price through high freight rates (compared to cost) and many
railroad owners became very wealthy .

Common laws and State laws

were used in an effort to prevent railroads from becoming too
profitable.

However, many states believed that granting special

rights to railroads would serve to help public service by enhancing
profits.

States passed laws, therefore , which allowed huge freight

rates and almost prevented smaller shippers from making significant
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financial gains.

The laws were passed to promote investment and

growth in the railway industry.
In the absence of adequate regulation, it was only natural for
railroad owners to make their own rules, or to ignore the laws that
were not being enforced.

This absence of adequate laws resulted in

the public being abused by the railroads' actions.
In 1887, railroads had a virtual monopoly over efficient,
convenient passenger and freight transportation . Concerned about
abuses that accompanied the monopoly, Congress passed the Interstate
Commerce Act, which created the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
to regulate rates and protect rail shippers (AAR Background 3) .
In the following decades, conditions changed.

Transportation

via trucks, buses, barges and pl anes grew and prospered.
more people traveled by bus and plane than by rail.

By 1950,

By the

mid-1950 's , the rail share of the commercial intercity freight
market dipped below 50% (3) .
Despite intense competition, railroads continued to be
regulated.

This regulation became even more stringent.

Ultimately , there was regulatory oversight for almost all railroad
management decisions.
railroads .

These regulations had an enormous impact on

Initiative was stifled , technological development was

slowed, costs were increased, and revenues were reduced . The
following will illustrate this point:
In the early 1960's , Southern Railway (today part of Norfolk
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Southern) developed a new service for grain shippers.

Utilizing

jumbo hopper cars moving in multiples of five, Southern proposed
reducing grain shippers' rates by up to 60%.

These rates were

called the "Big John" rates (3).
One might have thought that this move would be welcomed since
it offered potentially great savings for consumers.

However, the

ICC rejected the plan, not because it was unsuitable for Southern's
customers, not because it was unsuitable for consumers, not even
because it was unprofitable, but because it would hurt competing
carriers, especially government-subsidized water carriers (4).
In the l ate 1960's, Illinois Central Railroad developed a plan
cal led "Rent-a-train", involving the lease of entire trains to
shippers.

The ICC hailed the plan as an important "innovation in

rail transportation pricing".

However, the ICC finally disallowed

key provisions that involved guaranteeing train schedules,
contending violation of the Interstate Commerce Act's prohibition
against granting rebates, since the plan offered an economic penalty
if the railroad did not meet the schedule that was promised (4).
During the late 1970' s, the ICC ordered railroads to break up
unit trains that operated at lower per- unit costs than cars in
single-car service.

(In unit-train service, all cars carry the same

commodity and the shipper pays a reduced multiple-car rate.)

The

ICC took this action because railroads were experiencing some grain
car shortages at the time.

The ICC thought these shortages should
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be more evenly spread among all shippers since the railroads were
not allowed to discriminate in car supply.

What the ICC action

guaranteed was that shortages would mushroom, since cars pul l ed out
of unit-train service made fewer trips per harvest season (5).
At the same time, the ICC was requiring railroads to continue
service on some rai l lines in which revenues did not come cl ose to
matching operating costs.
While there are no records showing railroad profitability or
revenue prior to 1929, it is evident that railroads (Table I and
Table II), as a group, have not improved from an operating revenue
or a net operating income viewpoint today (1988) than in 1929 (AAR
Railroad Facts 17).

Operating revenue and net income grew

initially, but continues to be flat since 1980 .
Regulation has been a vicious circle .

First the absence of

regulation and public abuse by railroads existed; second, regulation
and the overprotection of the public; currently, deregulation (some
call it re-regulation) allows the railroads the opportunity to
further abuse the public.

In order to understand this concern about

abuses , we should review the past evils and laws which led to the
original Act to regulate interstate commerce.

Prelegislative evils which plagued the railroad industry in the
early years were:

6

I. Rebates
One of the most prevalent abuses was the railroads' offer
and acceptance by preferred shippers of secret rebates.
2. Discrimination

Railroads would discriminate by offering rates and services
to one shipper over other shippers under substantially
similar circumstances and conditions.
3. Special Rates

Railroads would offer extremely low rates to favored
shippers.

These rates were awarded to larger shippers,

leaving smaller shippers a higher freight charge.
4. Railroad Pass

The railroads would provide free passage to influential
politicians.
5. Unpublished Rates

Rates were not published.

Railroads could, therefore, abuse

shippers in yet another way (Knorst 25).
laws were then passed to counter these evils.
Laws

In 1886, the Supreme Court, in the case of the Wabash, St.
Louis and Pacific Railway Company against the State of Illinois, 118
U.S. 224, 247, made reference to a previous holding in the case of
Peik versus C & NW Railroad Company, 94 U.S. 164 , as follows:
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As to the effect of the statute as a regulation of
Interstate Commerce, the law is confined to State
Commerce, or such Interstate Commerce as directly affects
the people of Wisconsin. Until Congress acts in reference
to the relations of this company to Interstate Commerce,
it is certainly within the power of Wisconsin to regulate
its fares, etc. so far as they are of domestic concern.
With the people of Wisconsin, this railroad company has
domestic relations. Incidentally, these may reach beyond
the state. But certainly, until Congress undertakes to
legislate for those who are without the state, Wisconsin
may provide for those within, even though it may directly
affect those without (Knorst 31).
This opinion, and pressure from the public, finally impressed
Congress that there was a need to regulate Interstate Commerce via
rail.

In 1887, Congress passed the Act to regulate all Interstate

Commerce.

The Act's major provisions are shown in Appendix A and

are the important parts of the first act to regulate commerce.
These provisions prescribed railroads' duties and obligations which,
by its passage, were brought under Federal regulations.
While the legal basis for U.S. transportation consists of
common law, Federal and State constitutions and statutes passed by
legislative bodies plus the Interstate Commerce Act, railroad abuses
have prompted Americans repeatedly to seek legal remedies in the
court.

Appendix Bis a partial li sting of those cases indicating

the seriousness of the problem.
Statement of Problem

At one time the railroads were symbols of progress, power and
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Table I
Net Railway Operating Income
(Amounts Shown in Thousands)

Year

United
States

1929
1939
1944
1947
1951

$1,251,698
588,829
1,106,327
780,694
9142' 542

1955
1960
1965
1970
1975

1,127,997
584,016
9161 '516
485,854
350,682

678 , 557
290 , 095
515,444
106,147
(8,747)

449,440
293,921
446,072
379,707
359, 429

1979
1980
1981
1982

860,684
1,338, 551
1,360,611
742,231

183,005
424,042
622 , 966
262,544

677,679
914,509
737 , 645
479,687

1983

1,837,854

870,047

967,807

1984
1985
1986
1987

2,5,36,673
1,746,386
506,591
1, 756 , 460

1,318,599
760,143
739 , 971
644 , 916

1988

I, 979,719

830,256

SOURCE:

East
$

767,276
410,713
618,568
407 , 124
539,417

West
$

484,422
178,116
487,759
373,570
403,125

1,218,074
986,243
(233,380}
1,111,544
1,149,463

Association of American Railroads. Railroad
Facts . 1989 Edition. Washington, DC 1989 .
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Table II
Operating Revenue
(Amounts Shown in Thousands)

Year

Un ited
States

East

W
est

1929
1939
1944
1947
1951

$6,279,521
3,995,004
9,436,790
8,684,918
10,390,611

$3,886,879
2,480,208
5,416,089
5,137,930
6,083,725

$2,392,642
1,514,796
4,020,701
3,546,988
4,306,886

1955
1960
1965
1970
1975

10,106,330
9,514,294
10,207,850
11,991,658
16,401,860

5,815,997
5,291,650
5,651,838
6, 544,073
8,535,831

4,290,333
4,222,644
4,556,012
5,447,585
7,866,029

1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

25 , 352,257
28,257,548
30 , 898,610
27 , 503,503
26,729,392

12,659,147
13,588,703
14,879,268
13,357,745
12,217,397

12,693,110
14,668,845
16 ,019,342
14 , 145,758
14 , 511 ,995

1984
1985
1986
1987
1988

29,453,446
27,586,441
26,204,122
26,622,482
27,934,285

13,566,348
12,918,574
12,235,170
12 ,302 , 246
12,490,320

15,887,098
14 ,667,867
13,968,952
14,320,236
15,443,965

SOURCE:

Association of American Railroads. Railroad
Facts. 1989 Edition. Washington, DC 1989.
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growth and were credited with helping to build and unite a nation.
By the end of the 1970's, the railroads' condition had changed
dramatically.

Progress and growth were seemingly in the past, not

in the present or future.
By the 1970's, the railroads financial condition had
deteriorated significantly.
bankrupt.

More than 20% of the industry was

Railroad return on investment hovered near 2%.

Needed

improvements were delayed because low earnings could not attract the
required capital.

Maintenance programs were slashed because

railroads sought to conserve cash . Some railroads sought out other
ways to improve earnings, investing in everything from hotels and
amusement parks to truck lines and barge lines (AAR Background 12).
Earnings from operations were so bad on the railroads that,
because of the lack of money, nothing was spent on maintenance and a
new term emerged in railroad language--the standing derailment.

The

derailment occurred when freight cars fell from the track while
standing perfectly still because inadequately maintained track and
roadbed collapsed beneath them (12).
Almost 50,000 miles of track could be operated only at reduced
speeds, some as slow as 10 miles per hour.

Service deteriorated and

marketshare spiraled downward as shippers found other modes which
satisfied their demands for reliable service (12) .
Yet, this ailing industry wa.s still vital to the nation's
economy, since it supplied some 37% of its intercity freight
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transportation, was responsible for tens of billions of dollars
worth of economic activity, and employed hundreds of thousands of
workers (12) .
Clearly, something had to change if railroads were to continue
performing a vital role in the economy.
likely choice.

Nationalization seemed a

But, nationalization would cost taxpayers at l east

$100 billion to acquire railroad assets.

Billions more might be

necessary in annual subsidies to keep the trains running.
Congress, shippers and railroads agreed that a solution
addressing the root causes of the so-called "railroad problem" were
necessary.

Congress studied the forces which had combined to bring

about the railroads' deteriorat ion .

Ultimately, sound policies were

formulated which could restore the railroads' ability to help build
America's economy without massive infusions of federal funds.
Studies by Congress and studies conducted by others at
Congress' direction led this legislative body to conclude that a
successful railroad industry could be recreated only through partial
economic deregulation.

Thus, the Staggers Rail Act was born.

The Staggers Rail Act of 1980, with few exceptions, is proving
to be a piece of legislation that is close to accompli shing what
Congress had intended . The Interstate Commerce Commission can help
through stricter enforcement.

If stricter enforcement is provided,

this legislation can actually meet its expectations.
The Staggers Rail Act restored an industry on the brink of

u
collapse and possible nat ionalization . Also, it enabled Conrail,
once dependent on government ownership for survival, to be returned
to public ownership through a successful public stock offering .
Deferred maintenance, once rampant, is now a rarity.
Accidents, fatalities and freight damage have dropped as safety has
improved.

Erosion of marketshare has been arrested, although not

reversed.

Rates have moderated.

Deregulation has not ended the railroad industry's financial
problems, however , and the industry must continue to improve
productivity to gain economic health.
An example showing what the railroad industry will do given new
freedoms is detailed in Table Ill . Since Staggers, millions of
dollars have been diverted from equipment purchases and into the
roadbed.

American industry is experiencing a shift in the

investment burden for railcars from railroads to the public.

This

is an unexpected result of the railroads' new freedom .
Regulate and you hamper initiative, growth and profitability .
Deregulate and you run the risk of the public being abused.

A

review of the pros and cons will enable us to arrive at a solution.
The purpose of this study will be to examine the ability of the
nation 's railroads to function effectively without economic
regulation and decide if a return to regulation will be required to
prevent abuses arising from the railroads' new economic freedoms
allowed under the Staggers Rail Act.

Table Ill

U.S. Class I Railroads
Capital Expenditures
$ Millions

3,500 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - ----,
3 ,000 I • • • •••• • •• • • • . '
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Chapter II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Railroads

The 4R Act and Staggers Rail Act (partially deregulating
railroads) eased the way for the creation of new non- Class I, or
"small" railroads.

These railroads are an important part of our

nation's rail transportation system.
Railroads are described by three distinct groups of size.

The

large Class I railroads , the regional railroads, and the local
railroads.
Class I Railroad

The term "Class I railroads" is a regulatory classification
based on an annual revenue threshold . This threshold, set by the
ICC , is indexed to a base of $50 million in 1978, and adjusted
annually in concert with changes in the "Railroad Freight Rate
Index" published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

In 1987, the

Class I threshold was $87.9 million in annual operating revenue.
There were 18 Class I railroads (owned by 16 Class I systems)
reporting to the ICC in 1987.

Declassification from Class I status

requires a railroad to be below the threshold for three years in a
14
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row.

The Commission also sets annual revenue criteria for "Class

II" and "Class III " railroads.

In 1987, the revenue criterion was

between $17.6 and $87.9 million for the Class II railroads, and
$17.5 million or under for Class III railroads.

Neither Class II

nor Class III railroads report their operating and financial
statistics to the ICC, and annual revenue levels of these railroads
are not publicly available (Statistics 1) .
Regional Railroad

"Regional railroad" is a term defined by the Economics and
Finance Department (E&F) of the AAR.

The rationale for the change

from the traditional "class" designation (which was established
solely for regulatory purposes) is that smaller railroads have
characteristics other than revenue which make them distinct from the
large Class I , ICC-regulated , railroads, as well as distinct from
each other.

Aside from revenue, these characteristics could include

such factors as miles of track operated, level of traffic, and size
of plant.

At this time, because of limited data , E & F has defined

"Regional railroads" as those non-Class I, line-haul , freight
railroads which operate at least 350 miles of road and/or earn at
least $40 million in revenue.

At the beginning of 1988, there were

27 Regional railroads in the United States (1).
Local Railroad

16

Like "Regional railroad", the term "Local railroad" is also
designated by E&F, and defined as freight railroads which are not
Class I or Regional; they operate under 350 miles of road and earn
less than $40 million annually.

At the beginning of 1988, there

were 457 Local railroads in the United States, including 172
"Switching and Terminal railroads".

This latter sub-category is

comprised of railroads which are not primarily line-haul carriers,
but rather perform switching and/or terminal services for other
railroads.

These railroads usually have a relatively large number

of employees per mile of track operated (2).
A profile of the rail industry by ownership of railroads is
shown in Table IV . Table V shows the principle commodities
hauled by type of railroad .
4R and Staggers Acts

Deregulation of the nation 's railroads and the growth in the
number of "smaller" railroads began with the Railroad Revitalization
and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4R Act) and continued with the
Staggers Rail Act of 1980 (Railroads 99-101) .
The 4R Act was the first significant revision of the Interstate
Commerce Act.

The original act was extended to include motor

carriers by the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, Part II; the Water
Carrier Act of 1940, Part III; the Freight Forwarder Act of 1942,
Part IV; and the Transportation Act of 1958, Part V, which provided

TABLE IV
17

PROFILE OF THE RAIL INDUSTRY BY OWNERSHIP
OF RAILROADS

OWNERSHIP OF RAILROAD
CL.ASS I SYSTEMS

Class I Railroads
Regional Railroad Subsidiaries
Local Railroad Subsidiaries
Switching & Terminal Subsidiaries

REGIONAL RAILROADS
Regional Railroads
LOCAL RAILROADS
Local Railroads
Local Railroad Subsidiaries
Switchi ng &Terminal Subsidiaries

MILES
OF ROAD
OPERATED

EMPLOYEES

27
29

153,294
147,568
2,854
1,751
1, 121

244,267
235,814
2,145
902
5,406

19
19

11,601
11,601

6,925
6,925

177

9,338
9,228
107

3,754
3,727
21

3

6

2,222
1,924
260
38

706
636
23
47

2,759
175
1,974
610

5,473
1,349
1,414
2,710

1,558
470
783
305

1,127
508
214
405

5
_3

441
431
10

242
235

502

181,213

262,494

NUMBER
80
18
6

168
8
1

SWITCHING &TERMINAL RAILROADS
Switching & Terminal Railroads
Local Railroad Subsidiaries
Switching & Terminal Subsidiaries

90
86

SHIPPER-OWNED RAILROADS
Regional Railroad Subsidiaries
Local Railroad Subsidiaries
Switching &Terminal Subsidiaries

97

1
3
1

61
35

PUBLICLY-OWNED RAILROADS
Regional Railroad Subsidiaries
Local Railroad Subsidiaries
Switching & Terminal Subsidiaries

31

CAR LESSOR-OWNED RAILROADS
Local Railroad Subsidiaries
Switching & Terminal Subsidiaries

8

TOTAL, ALL ROADS

Source:

1

15
15

Statistics of Regional and Local Railroads Economi cs and Finance Department
Association of American Railroads 1988.
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TABLE V
18

PRINCIPAL C<Jll)()ITIES BY TYPE OF RAILROAD

Regional

Cl ass I

Coal

Meta 11 i c Ores

Chemicals

Coal

Farm Products

Pulp and Paper

Food Products

Lumber and Wood

Non- Metallic Minera1s

Non-Metallic Minerals

I

Switching
and Tenninal

Local

Coal

Coal

Lumber and Wood

Farm Products

Pulp and Paper

Non-Metallic Minerals

Metallic Ores

Primary Metal Products

Farm Products

Waste and Scrap

Source: Transportation Deregulat ion what's Regulated and ~hat Isn't.
Kal isa and Cutler . ~ash ington, DC 1986.

Sweeney, McCarthy,

19

financing guarantees for the railroads.
Congress decided that the 4R Act did not provide adequate
deregulation.

In 1980, Congress enacted the Staggers Rail Act of

1980 , which further amended the Interstate Commerce Act.

As

interpreted by an Interstate Commerce Commission comprised of
deregulation advocates, the Staggers Rail Act led to radical
changes in railroad regulation.

The Act al so authorized the

Commission to carry on the process of railroad deregulation by
allowing exemptions for transactions or services not specifically
deregulated by the statute.

The law gave the Commission, a body of

political appointees largely without any significant transportation
experience, the authority to set l aws pertaining to regulation
versus deregulation of commerce via rail i n the United States .
The Commissi on's authority to set laws was authorized by
49.U.S.C. Section 10505.

Detail s are available in Appendix C (2) .

Railroads continue to be regulated in many ways.

The ability

to enter the business remains under the Commission's jurisdiction.
Railroad employee job protection 'When lines are sold and pooling of
traffic, services or earnings among railroads continue to be under
the jurisdiction of the Commission.

All mergers , consolidations and

trackage rights (the right of one railroad to run over the tracks of
another) require Commission approval.

Rail carrier acquisition of

motor carrier and abandonments of active rail lines continues to be
governed by the Interstate Commerce Commission.

20

Shippers Rights

A shipper has few options if he finds that hi s rates are too
high and the rate level s prevent him from retaining his market or
seeking new markets.

The Staggers Rail Act made it almost

economically impossible for a shipper to prevent these situat ions.
The solutions are four separate statutory provisions found in the
Act which provide information about the ability to prevent the
abuses of high rates.
Appendix D.

These provisions are further detailed in

The problem is that the Interstate Commerce Commission

has never fully exercised the power to protect shippers that was
given to them by Congress.

Instead, the Commission was, and is

still, concerned mostly with the rai lroads earning adequate revenue.
Revenue Adequacy

Congress was very concerned with railroad revenue adequacy.

A

railroad is considered revenue adequate when its return on
investment exceeds its cost of capital.

When this happens, shippers

can object to increases in rates (Traffic World 5).
The ICC announced November 17, 1989, that it had finally found
two Class I railroads , the Fl orida East Coast Railway Company (FEC)
and the Norfolk Southern Corporation (NSC), to be revenue adequate
in 1988 . Two other railroads, the Burlington Northern (BN) and the
Chicago and North Western Transportation Company (C & NW) were
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"tentatively" found to be revenue adequate, subject to a final
review (5).
The ICC said the cost of capital for all railroads during 1988
was 11.7 percent.

The rate of return for the FEC was 14.6 percent.

The return for the Norfolk Southern was 13.1 percent.

The rates of

return for the Burlington Northern and C & NW were tentatively set
at 11 .8 percent and 11 .9 percent , awaiting further analysis.

The

weighted industry average return for all 15 surveyed carriers was
7.0 percent, up from 5.9 percent in 1987 (5).
The ICC 's revenue adequacy findings were reported in Ex Parte
No. 483 . The ICC's decision, the first time in seven years it has
found a Class I railroad to have a rate of return on investment at
least equal to the indu stry's current cost of capital, will
seriously inhibit those railroad's ability to raise rates on
so-called captive shippers without undergoing government review.
In addition to losing zone or rate f l exibility (where the
railroads are permitted to raise rates up to 4% without regulatory
review), the revenue-adequate railroads should expect the ICC to
apply a much tougher standard in reasonable rate cases . However, 11
other Class I railroads fail ed to meet the ICC 's revenue adequacy
threshold.

The four railroads found to be revenue adequate,

tentatively or otherwise (FEC, NSC, BN and CNW), operated 74,186
miles of track in 1988, only 31 percent of all Class I railroad
track in operation (6).
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The last t ime Cl ass I railroads were j udged revenue adequate
was 1982 . The two lines were the Clinchfield Railroad and the Fort
Worth & Denver, both of which have since been absorbed by CSX
Transportation and the Burlington Northern, respectively (6) .
While the nati on's rai lroads bemoan their fate , arguing of
unfair advantages by motor carriers and arcane labor laws that are
bleeding t hem dry, t heir own numbers would seem to indicate a far
different story.

Even though the railroads defend the ICC revenue

adequacy determination for 1988 by noti ng t hat i t is just one year,
the fact remains the industry has used t he decade of deregulation
following passage of the Staggers Act j udiciousl y (7).
In 1987 , revenue ton-miles per employee hour was up 17 . 6
percent .

Between 1978 and 1987 , revenue t on- mil es per employee hour

has doubled.

From 1980 to 1987 total wages paid decreased 18

percent (AAR 56) .

Total labor costs in 1987 represented 42 . 5

percent of the railroads' revenue dollar . Ten years ago the
figure was 50 percent (6).
Operating expenses declined 4.1 percent in 1987 to $23 . 9
billion from $24.9 bil li on in 1986.

Net railway operating income in

1987 totaled nearly $1 .8 billion, more than three times the level i n
the previous year.

Excluding special charges, the increase in

1987 's net railway operating i ncome would have been 13.3 percent
(6) .

Si nce 1985 , the average rate of return on investment has been
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5.27 percent.

In the years preceding this decade, the rate of

return has gone over 4.22 percent just twice, at 4.70 percent in
1944 and 5.30 percent in 1929 (8).
The rate of return on shareholders' equity increased
dramatically in 1987 to 8.05 percent from 2.1 percent in 1986 .

The

average rate of return on equity from 1983 through 1985 was 8.01
percent.

The average rate of return on equity for the last three

years, before deregulation , was 4.26 percent (9).
New issuances of equipment debt fell to a modern-day low of
$140.3 million in 1987.

Total outstanding debt on equipment has

been reduced to $3.5 billion, the lowest it has been in 27 years

(9).
Revenue ton-miles reached a record level in 1987 of nearly 944
billion.

In 1987, for the first time in memory, railroads increased

on a ton-mile percentage basis the share of the intercity freight
market, while trucks registered a slight decrease (11).
The average freight train in 1987 carried a record 2,644 tons
of freight.

The net ton-miles per train-hour, a statistic

reflecting both the number of tons hauled and miles traveled
during an average hour of freight train 's operation averaged a
record 58 ,703 in 1987 (11).
Ton-miles per loaded car rose in 1987 to 45,808.
decade, the average has increased 20 percent.

In the past

In 1987, railroads

generated 307 ton-miles for every gallon of fuel consumed, measuring
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a 5.9 percent increase over 1986.

Over the past 10 years, this

measure of energy efficiency (ton-miles per gal lon) has increased by
40.2 percent (12).
The measure of ton-miles per employee is sometimes used as an
estimate of employee productivity.

The railroads reported freight

revenue ton-miles per unit of employment as 3.8 million ton-miles
per employee and 1,531 ton miles per employee hour in 1987, a 17.6
percent boost over the 1986 figures (13).
These figure s all indicate that the railroads are becoming
healthier since Staggers deregulated interstate rail commerce.
However, the individual states still regulate intrastate commerce
and some continue to have an effect on railroad efficiency and
profitability.
States Rights

States rights are vague with the new law.

Jurisdiction over

intrastate rail rates is covered in 49 U.S.C. Section
1150l(a-d)(86) .

The Act provides that the ICC shall certify a state

to set law if the Commission determines that the State's standards
and procedures are acceptable .

If the Commission denies

certification to a state, the ICC assumes full jurisdictional
authority over intrastate rates in such state.

A summary of such

authority as of December 24, 1985 is shown in Table VI.
The table indicates that states differ with the Federal
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governments view on deregulation and its citizens continue to seek
protection through economic regulation of the railroads.

Therefore,

most states have requested certification by the ICC to set its own
laws.
Hearings on Staggers

The requests for more regulation leaves us with one question
remaining about the effects of rail deregulation on our economy.
Imagine that you are listening to testimony from various groups
involved in the controversy about more or less regulation and that
you have to decide the degree of regulation to be mandated.
The following groups expressed their views at the 1985 oversign
hearing on the Staggers Rail Act before the Surface Transportation
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation.
Chairman Reese H. Taylor, Jr., submitted the views of the ICC:
In our view, the Staggers Act and our implementation of it
have been generally successful in removing unnecessary
regulation, encouraging efficient carriers to earn
adequate revenues and to respond quickly to satisfy
shippers' changing needs, and balancing the interests of
the parties in accordance with the goals of the Act . The
ultimate result, we believe, has been, and will continue
to be, a more healthy, competitive, and responsive rail
industry (Sweeney 97- 106).
He also cited the railroad industry's improved earnings in 1984
as evidence of the Staggers Rail Act success and noted that the

26

Table VI
State Intrastate Rail Rate Authority
States Which
Have Final
Certification
Alabama
Arkansas
Georgia
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Maryland
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
New Hampshire
New Mexico
New York
North Dakota
Oregon
South Carolina
Tennessee
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin

States
Which Have
Provisional
Certification
Colorado
Illinois
Louisiana
Minnesota
Oklahoma
Utah
Washington

States
States
In Which
In Which No
ICC has
Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction
Exists
Florida
South Dakota
Idaho
Arizona
Nebraska
Hawaii
New Jersey
Maine
Ohio
Massachusetts
Pennsylvania Rhode Island
Wyoming
Vermont
Texas
District of
Alaska
Columbia
California
Connecticut
Delaware
Nevada
North Carolina

!These states withdrew their applications for final
certification and, consequently, the ICC has assumed
jurisdiction in those states.
2Texas has been decertified and the ICC has assumed
jurisdiction there.
3The Governor of Alaska filed a request asking the ICC to
assume jurisdiction with the provision that it may seek
certification at a later date.
4These states filed requests asking the ICC to assume
jurisdiction.
5South Dakota filed a request specifically asking the ICC
not to assume jurisdiction.
6These states took no action whatsoever.
Source: Transportation Deregulation llhat's Regulated and What Isn't.
Kalisa and Cutler . Washington, DC 1986.

Sweeney, McCarthy,
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industry's rate of return on investment was the highest in 40 years.
The National Industrial Transportation League

The National Industrial Transportation League {NITL), an
organization representing sh ippers, shippers' associations and other
transportation purchasers believes that the Staggers Act has
achieved a workabl e balance between the goals of assuring the
railroads revenue adequacy and maintaining and fostering effective
competition within the railroad industry.
The NITL feels the Staggers Act promotes a new environment in
which shippers and railroads act as business partners and seek
solutions to problems instead of bringing suit before the Interstate
Commerce Commission.
However, the Nill has also mandated that it is not satisfied
with the ICC's interpretation and administration of the Staggers
Rail Act, criticizing the ICC for failure to give adequate emphasis
to the 1980 reform law's goal of maintaining and fostering
competition in this industry. NITL's testimony concluded with this
caveat:
While we would prefer a negotiated, regulatory solution to
our problems, the League will not hesitate in the future
to seek Congressional action to assure that the Staggers
Act's competitive objectives become a reality for all
shippers (99).
Consumers Union for Rail Equity
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Consumers United for Rail Equity (C.U.R.E.), a leading group of
shippers campaigning for legislative relief from the Staggers Act,
testified at the Oversight Hearing through Edward F. Mitchell,
President of Potomac Electric Power Company and Chairman of C.U.R.E.
Formed in July 1984, 80 members were identified as 62 electricgenerating companies and 18 coal producers.

Beyond immediate

membership, C.U.R.E. noted that a number of other groups and
associations are working under the C.U.R.E. Coalition.
C.U.R.E.'s position on the Staggers Rail Act was summarized as
follows:
We believe the Interstate Commerce Commission's
implementation of the Staggers Rail Act has focused almost
exclusively on improving the financial health of the
railroads and has failed to achieve two other major goals
of the Staggers Act: the protection of captive shippers
against unreasonable rail rates and the assurance of
maximum competition between the railroads. The Staggers
Act was a compromise that balanced the need for partial
deregulation of the railroad industry with the need to
protect captive shippers against unreasonable rates and
the need to maintain railroad competition. Since efforts
to achieve Commission action that implements this balance
have not been successful, the members of C.U.R.E. and the
C.U.R.E. Coalition now support the enactment of the
Consumer Rail Equity Act, S. 477, which was introduced by
Senators Andrews, Long, Ford and Stevens and has now been
co-sponsored by six members of this committee, including
Senators Exon, Gore and Rockefell er. These Senators all
represent the view that new regulation is needed (101).
Mr. Mitchell acknowledged the ICC for working hard to improve
the financial health of the railroads but criticized it for doing
little to protect captive shippers or to assure competition among
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railroads.

He stated that captive shippers are without protection

against unreasonably high rates, and underscored C.U.R.E.'s
complaint by noting that the ICC has so interpreted the Staggers
Rail Act that no railroad is considered revenue adequate. The
Commission has yet to order any captive shipper's rate to be
reduced.
Based on the ICC ' s performance to date, C.U.R.E. is convinced
that competition among railroads and reasonable rates for shippers
can only be obtained through further legislation.

As examples of

the inadequacy of remedies for captive coal shippers before the ICC,
Mitchell noted that the situation of (1) Potomac Electric Power
Company, whose coal rates increased by 80 percent from 1979 to 1984
and which has had two unresolved rate complaints pending before the
ICC since 1980; and (2) the experience of Kansas City Power & l ight
Company, which filed a complaint about rail rates from the Powder
River Basin which increased 47 percent since the Staggers Rail Act
(as compared with a corresponding 27 percent increase in the Rail
Cost Adjustment Factor), only to be told by the ICC that no relief
is available because the Burlington Northern is not revenue
adequate.
Procompetitive Rail Steering Conmittee

The Procompetitive Rail Steering Committee, a group consisting
of major shippers and the Grand Trunk System Railroads, presented
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views regarding the current status of rail regulation at the
National Industrial Transportation League's Annual Meeting on
November 20, 1985.

Spokesman, Fred M. Zitto, explained that the

group's experience under the Staggers Act has generally been
excellent in situations in which there is competition.
The problems that we have experienced have not been with
the Staggers Act itself, but with the failure of the
Interstate Commerce Commission to administer the Act as
intended by Congress . The refusal to protect shippers and
railroads alike against the anticompetitive actions of
some railroads is the major complaint. (101)
Zitto pointed to the examples of the Commission's failure to
promote competition in the railroad i ndustry through cancellation of
thousands of joint rates and routes, the cancellation of numerous
reciprocal switching arrangements, the increase of numerous
reciprocal switching charges, and the Commission's unwillingness to
find a single rail rate unreasonable since the passage of the
Staggers Act.
Zitto also expressed his concern that the Procompetitive
Committee has become increasingly pessimistic about prospects for
attaining meaningful improvement without further l egislati on (102).
Co11111ittee Against Revising Staggers

A contrary view was expressed before the subcommittee by the
Committee Against Revising Staggers (CARS), which has 320 rail
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shippers in its coalition, including shippers of manufactured goods
and bulk commodities (103) .

Its position was presented by its

Co-chairmen, William Melville of the Kennecott Company, and John
Archer of Crown Zellerbach.

This group's support of the Stagger

Rail Act and opposition to efforts at revision is grounded on
conclusions that the Staggers Rail Act is working well for shippers
by providing better service and market-oriented rates.

The Act is

assuring shippers reliable future rail service by restoring the rail
industry to financi al health (103) .
There are various reactions to the Staggers Rail Act among
railroads .

So far, the larger the railroad the greater the

enthusiasm for the Act because of the railroad protection cited
herein.

Most of the benefits for the large railroads have come

about through the enhanced ability to raise many rates free of
Interstate Commerce Commission control.

More importantly, it gave

them broader authority to sign l ong-term contracts with major
shippers and al l owed them to abandon routes and branch lines more
easily (Traffic World 11).
Since Staggers, major railroads have reduced their work force
by 50 percent or nearly 250,000 people.
enormous reduction in operating cost.

This has resulted in an
The downsizing of major

railroads was eased by the ICC' s policy of not imposing labor
protection on line sales to regional carriers and by allowing
railroads to obtain trackage rights (agreement between two carriers)
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to operate over each other's lines (11).
The short line railroads believe their time has finally
arrived however.

"They may be longer, but we're just as wide."

No

one disagreed with those words at the American Short Line Railroad
Association's annual meeting on September 24, 1990 (The Journal of
Commerce 2B).
It is estimated that the feeder rai l network (short lines) are
now beginning to prosper and that they could grow to 25% of the
national rail network by the year 2000 .
freight will then be touched by

a

Forty percent of rail

short line (2B).

The major lines

problems with too much overhead, too little traffic, and too much
rai lroad is being solved with the smaller companies low overhead and
non-union status.
The American Short-line Railroad Association

The American Short Line Railroad Association (ASLRA),
consisting of 285 short-line raillroads, also testified at the
Oversight Hearing in 1985 (Sweeney 103).
ASLRA expressed opposition to the ICC's decision to completely
deregulate boxcar shipments.

This ICC action eliminated any need

for filing of rates and allowed railroads to quote any price they
wished to charge for boxcar shipments on a day-to-day basis.
ASLRA's complaint regarding an ICC boxcar deregulation decision is
that it also "drastically altered the framework of car hire
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compensation to favor the large Class I railroads, including the
right to assess an empty movement charge of 35 cents per mile"
(104).
Another concern of the short-line group relates to joint rates.
Historically, short lines participated in joint single-factor rates
and were accorded divisions.

The Staggers Rail Act extensively

revised the joint rate rules to give rai lroads freedom to depart
from that arrangement.

However, AS LRA complained that the ICC has

gone too far in allowing railroads to depart from joint rates and
cited court criticism of ICC in that regard (103) .

Regardless, "in

spite of these court reversals , no solutions have been forthcoming
from the Commission and joint rates have not been reinstated."
ASLRA completed its testimony by issuing this warning:
If the Commission does not respond promptly with actions
that provide solutions for small railroads, then remedial
action will be necessary and it may have to come from the
Congress . . . (106).
Railroads Against Monopoly

Similar concerns were voiced by the MKT Railroad and Railroads
Against Monopoly (RAM) through joint spokesman, Harold L. Gastler,
President of MKT.

He described RAM as a coalition of regional and

smaller railroads which have united to remedy some of the abuses
that have arisen under the Staggers Rail Act.

Its membership

includes the B & LE, the Florida East Coast and the Grand Trunk
(104).
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As primary abuses since the Staggers Act was passed, RAM cited
(1) the cancellation of efficient joint rates in which members
previously participated in the routes and rate negotiations with the
larger railroads marketing departments and (2) the refusals of large
rail connections to join with them in new joint rate proposals which
again fostered monopoly by excluding the smaller railroads from
involving themselves with the larger Class I railroads in the
marketplace .

RAM reported that the abuses cited have been brought

before the ICC in various contexts, but the Commission has done
nothing to rectify the problem .

The regional railroads now expect

no solutions from the ICC in the near future.

.

(

Ultimately, RAM

proposes joint rate legislation to amend the Staggers Rail Act in
order to resolve these probl ems (104) .
National Association of Regulatory Utility Co11'111issioners

The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
(NARUC) has a dual interest in the effects of the Staggers Rail Act.
Member state agencies have the responsibility of regulating electric
utility rates and of regulating intrastate rail transportation.
Obviously, the Staggers Rai l Act threatened the viability of the
states' railroad regulatory systems.

NARUC is deeply concerned with

the prices electric utilities pay to transport domestic coal (105).
A major factor in increasing the price of coal transport as
well as other commodities for captive shippers is the Interstate
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Commerce Commission's startling interpretation of the Staggers Act.
The rate-making standards used by the ICC bear no real relation to
the cost of providing service and are different from those standards
used by state regulatory commissions who are generally still
regulated .
The intent of the Staggers Act was to apply regulation early to
those markets where competition did not provide effective control.
A market was presumed to be competitive if the revenue to variable
cost was below the jurisdictional threshold (originally 160 percent
and now 180 percent using the ICC's rail form, a costing method),
and no rate regulation was needed for such markets .

If the rates

were above the threshold, rates were regulated Q!l}_y if it were shown
that the railroads involved had market dominance (Railroads 100).
The dilemma was what was considered market dominance.

With

the role of the rate bureaus reduced, railroads were encouraged to
act with greater independence.

This created difficulties in an

industry whose structure required a high degree of interdependence.
By eliminating routes from joint rate tariffs or closing
interchanges, a railroad could unilaterally close a through route
(route involving two or more carriers) or relegate it to minor
importance.

Using this leverage a railroad could increase its

revenue by seeking its longest possible haul on traffic.

The

removal of alternate routes meant a reduction in competition,
particularly when intermediate railroads were bypassed .

The same
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logic promoted an acceleration of the merger movement, also intended
to result in fewer, but healthier, competitors.

This allowed the

merged company to control more shipments over a greater portion of
their hauls, reducing the need to negotiate with connecting
railroads.

Ultimately, the railroad industry might be reduced to a

handful of giant companies, maybe even only two as in Canada (101).
In particular , NARUC is concerned with the ICC's revenue
adequacy test and use of stand-alone costs to determine when
monopoly rail rates are unreasonable.

NARUC believes that a

legislative solution i s necessary to provide captive coal shippers
with adequate protection against unreasonable transportation rates.
NARUC wholeheartedly supports S. 477, the Consumer Rail Equity Act,
which clarifies the intent of Congress in the Staggers Rail Act of
1980 by constraining the ICC from using aberrant regulatory
practices; also would provide rail shippers access to rail service
that is competitive and priced fairly and reasonably (Sweeney 105).
NARUC is strongly opposed to unwarranted Federal pre-emption of
State Authority to regulate intrastate rail matters.

Therefore, the

ANRUC seeks repeal of the State certification requirement contained
in the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C. Section 1150(b) while
leaving the ICC free to engage in appellate review of State
intrastate ratemaking decision under 49 U.S.C. Section 1150l(c) as
revised (105).
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Brookings Institute Study

Shippers and their customers have saved $20 billion a year in
transportation costs because of surface freight deregulation since
1980, a Brookings Institution study reported June 5, 1990 (Traffic
World 48).
Using economic models, the Brookings study found that rail
profitability increased by $2 . 9 billion a year, largely because the
rails were allowed to reduce excess capacity by abandoning routes,
cutting labor costs and other measures.

The truckload sector of the

trucking industry has benefitted slightly from the Motor Carrier Act
of 1980, the report said.

But the LTL sector has lost $5.3 billion

in profits annually and that portion of the industry has lost jobs
through consolidation of the industry (48).
The report states the net effect on surface freight
deregulation has been a redistribution of wealth from labor and the
LTL carriers to shippers, consumers and the railroads (48).
A report entitled, "The Economic Effects of Surface Freight
Deregulation," found that truck service to smal l communities had
been maintained or even improved and came at the expense of rail
service abandoned by large Class I carriers or left to short-line
railroads.
The report also noted that optimal rate levels have been
reached in the trucking industry.

Shippers could gain another $6
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billion in 1977 dollars if rail rates fell to marginal costs.

If

rail rates fell to the marginal cost level, the rails' financial
plight would worsen.
While the report did not indicate how the changes should be
made, it recommended several steps to enhance competition and
increase efficiency in surface transportation.

These included the

following items in the rail sector:
-

Encouraging rails to further reduce excess capacity, improve
labor productivity and increase efficiency of freight car
use.

-

Oppose anti-competitive mergers and promote reciprocal
switching among carriers.

In the truck sector, the authors favored:
-

Fully deregulati ng interstate and intrastate rates.

-

Promoting safety by stricter enforcement and more
inspections.
Promoting carrier efficiency by making user charges more
rational.

If shipper benefits or rail profitability seriousl y worsen, the
report recommends a contingency policy that would separate rail
operations and ownership of the infrastructure.
According to the report's authors, Clifford Winston, a senior
fellow at Brookings ; Thomas M. Corsi, a professor at the University
of Maryland; Curtis M. Grimm, associate professor at Maryland; and
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Carol A. Evans, a former research ass i stant at Brookings, this would
cr eate an interstate rail bed system simi lar to the interstate
hi ghway system with the users (railroads) paying a fee (toll) to
operate over the system.
Railroad Unifications

The railroads have been consolidating . Th is may be because of
the lack of sufficient return on i nves t ment which will f urther
reduce the possibi li ty of a ''choice" when shipping rail . Appendi x E
shows the merger and control takeovers s ince 1957 .
At the same time, larger Cl ass I railroads are spi nning off
unprofitable porti ons of t heir railroads.

These spi n off s make up a

large part of the growing number of r egional and l ocal carri ers as
shown in Appendix F, Profile of the Rail Industry by Type of
Railroad ; Appendi x G, showing Average Size of the Various Types of
Railroads; Appendi x H, showing the Distribution of Railroads by
State.
Conclusion

The research shows that a number of powerful groups oppose
aspect s of the Staggers Ra il Act.

Others oppose the way in which

the Act has been i mpl emented and administered by the ICC, and
continue to seek l egis lative remedies f rom Congress.
from those efforts will not be known for some time.

The results
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In a recent article in The Notice, a newsletter published by
the National Industrial Transportation League, it was reported that
the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee has
released a General Accounting Office (GAO) study which finds that
the 1980 Staggers Rail Act "has resulted in the nation's freight
railroads being more competitive, efficient, and financially
healthy" (157).
The GAO report, which is the first comprehensive look at the
industry since enactment of the 1980 law, said shippers "have
benefited in a number of ways.

Real rail rates have declined an

average about 22 percent since 1980, rail service has improved for
many shippers, and railroads generally are more responsive to
shippers' needs."
The GAO Report further states that, "Some shippers, however,
have not benefited.

Shippers transporting certain commodities -

coal, for example - have found that rail rates did not decline as
much as the average or that rates increased after passage of the
Staggers Rail Act."

No one railroad type can be blamed for coal,

however, since all types participate in the handling of coal as
shown in Table V.
Some small shippers have been unable to obtain contracts from
railroads or negotiate terms as favorable as those offered large
shippers.

In some cases, this situation has made these shippers

less competitive (157).
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Other shippers have experienced increased costs and/or lost
transportation alternatives because of line abandonments and the
cancellation of joint rates . These outcomes were not unexpected in
the transition to a more market-oriented, economical ly efficient
system of railroad regulation (158).
As for the Interstate Commerce Commission's implementation and
administration of the Act, GAO said that shippers believe that ICC 's
relief procedures are burdensome, time-consuming, and expensive.
Shippers also believe the ICC has not acted affirmatively to curb
market power abuse and/or increase railroad competition, actions the
shippers believe would protect t hei r interest (158).
Hypothesis

Based on the research, it is hypothesized that total
deregul ation of the nation's freight-carryi ng railroads is not in
the public's best interest.

The Interstate Commerce Commission must

provide the economic protection that the Staggers Rail Act so
clearly empowers it to provide.

Chapter III

SELECTIVE REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF RESEARCH

Does history always repeat itself?

If it does the Railroads

wi ll return to some of the abuses that plagued us in the past and
the American public will be subjected to rebates, discrimination,
spec ial rates, etc., which brought about regulation in the first
place.

Thi s will come about because the Interstate Commerce has

consistently acted in the interest of the railroads instead of
enforcing the protections to the publ i c that were written into the
Staggars Act of 1980.
The controversy focuses on those parts of the Staggers Act
where the Staggers Act did not remove the railroads from the
regulations which were put in place over time starting with the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.

These continuing protections

for certain railroad shippers were the subject of the compromise
between those who wanted complete deregulation and those who wanted
to maintain regulation and stated that certain economic regulation
would remain . Thi s compromise allowed the Staggers Act to be
enacted.

The allegation of captive shippers is that the Interstate

Commerce Commission has, through regulatory actions, nullified these
Congressional shipper protections and effectively deregulated the
railroads in areas where the Congress refused to do so in 1980.
42

The
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areas of controversy between shippers and the railroads include:

1. The process and criteria by which the ICC determines if a
complaining shipper is a "captive shipper" and, thus,
eligible for rate relief if the ICC finds the rate in
question to be ''unreasonable".

A captive shipper has access

to only one railroad and is therefore subject to possible
price gouging .
2. The process and criteria by which the ICC determines whether
a railroad is, either by the price charged or by the
absolute refusal to enter into an agreement with a second
railroad, attempting to deny a shipper competitive
transportation alternatives.

This practice would keep a

shipper from developing competition via another rail route,
rail truck or rail barge combinations.
3. The accuracy of certain ICC accounting standards, including
the index (Rail Cost Adjustment Factor) that is maintained
by the ICC to adjust railroad tariffs for inflation and the
test by which the ICC determines if a railroad is revenue
adequate.

The rail cost adjustment factor also determines

how much a railroad can raise tariff rates.
Captive Shipper Issues

Captive shippers are subject to all of the economic abuses that

44

have plagued shippers for decades.
Congress about:

They have complained to the

(1) the ICC's test for determining if a shipper is

captive and, thus, subject to regulatory protection from
unreasonable railroad rates; and (2) the test by which the ICC
determines if the captive shipper rate is "reasonable."

From 1980

until September 1986, on the eve of House Energy and Commerce
Committee consideration of ICC reform legislation, no captive
shipper had ever won a rate reduction at the ICC.

Today, under

Congressional pressure, the ICC has found in favor of six captive
shippers, but the rate reasonableness process remains confused,
burdensome, and unduly expensive.
Who is a Captive Shipper

No shipper is a captive shipper under the law and the rules of
the ICC unless and until the Commi ssion has found the shipper to be
captive in a specifi c fact situation.

A shipper may be a captive in

some situations and not captive i n others.
Essentially, captive shippers are those shippers who have no
alternative but to ship on a single railroad . These shippers are
found to be subject to "market dominance" by that railroad and ,
thus, have no market force that operates to assure that the rate in
question is reasonable.

These shi ppers tend to move bulk

commodities that are too heavy, wi de , dangerous, or uneconomic to
move on the highway and have no available water or alternate rail
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transportation.

The ICC has found at least 12 commodities to be

captive in certain circumstances.

The 12 commodities include coal,

wheat and barley, chemicals, corn syrup, soda ash, heavy electrical
equipment, and spent nuclear fuel .
To be found to be captive, the shipper must show the ICC that
(1) the rate of which he complains yields a revenue to variable cost
ratio of at least 180% and (2) the shipper has no transportation
alternative.

The railroad defends their high rates by attempting to

show that the revenue to variable cost ratio is less than 180%, or
that the shipper has the benefit of "product" or "geographic"
competition.
Captive shippers have no problem with the showings they must
make.

Captive shippers, however, are concerned about the "product"

and "geographic" showings which tend to be time consuming and
costly.

For instance, in McCarty Farms versus Burlington Northern,

a famous captive grain case at the ICC, the cost "product" and
"geographic" dispute continued for five years and cost the
complaining shippers approximately $1 mil l ion in consulting fees and
other costs.
Captive shippers seek the removal of the "product" and
"geographic" competition showings in the market dominance
determination.

These considerations are not required by the

Staggers Act and could be removed by ICC action.
Captive shipper rates must be at least 180% of variable cost .
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Variable cost refers to those costs that are directly attributable
to a specific railroad movement.

The revenue to variable cost ratio

refers to the ratio between the rate being charged and the variable
costs incurred.

For instance, if a railroad charges $25 for a

shipment with variable costs of $10, then the revenue to variable
cost is 250%.
112%.

By comparison, so-called "piggyback" rates average

Most competitive rates are in the 120% to 140% range and the

ICC says the railroads must average 150% across all traffic to be
"revenue adequate."
Captive shippers do not complain about the 180% minimum but are
concerned at how high above 180% the rate may be.

ICC rate cases

have revealed revenue to variable cost ratios ranging as high as
1200%.
Under the ICC's impl ementat ion of the Staggers Act, the captive
shippers carry the burden of proof on rate reasonableness and all
benefits of the doubt run with the railroads.

The basic rate

reasonableness test of the ICC is ''stand alone cost" - how much it
would cost the shipper to provide his own hypothetical, efficient
transportation alternative.

This test has worked well for some

captive shippers where the volumes are great and the transportation
corridor is densely traveled.

However, in other fact situations,

the test is unrealistic and appears to be in the process of being
rejected by the ICC for non-coal commodities .
the test is burdensome and costly.

In all circumstances,

A small army of consultants and
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experts is used to structure and cost out, line item by line item, a
complete but hypothetical railroad (or other alternative).
Captive shippers seek the same test for all commodities and a
more simplified test that can be based on "stand alone cost."

In

the summer of 1988, the capt ive shippers and the CSX and Union
Pacific railroads agreed on a simplified rate reasonableness test
that was included in Senator Rockefeller's compromise ICC reform
legislation considered by the Sen,a te Commerce Committee .
The Staggers Act does not require the ICC's present rate
reasonableness test and the ICC has the authority to simplify this
test.
Rail Cost Adjustment Factor

A prominent and l eg itimate railroad complaint during the 1979
hearings that led to the Staggers Rail Act was that ''regulatory lag"
at the ICC frustrated the railroads' ability to increase their rates
to reflect increases in their costs of goods and services .

The

Staggers Act, therefore, created a rail inflation index, called the
Rail Cost Adjustment Factor (RCAF), to be calculated on a quarterly
basis by the ICC, and provided that a railroad would be allowed (but
not required) to i ncrease any rate by the RCAF adjustment free of
any rate challenge from the ICC.
The proper implementation of the RCAF mechanism is of concern
to many shippers who are otherwise not captive, since the RCAF is
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used as the inflation escalator clause in many of the 55,000
railroad contracts that have been entered into since 1980.
Shippers argue that there have been two principal problems with
the ICC's implementation of the RCAF:

its failure to reflect

corresponding decreases in rail rates when railroad costs decrease,
and its failure to reflect railroad productivity gains .
After close and quite hostile questioning from the Congress
about the failure of the RCAF to reflect rate decreases based on
rail cost decreases in the wake of the collapse of OPEC in December
1985, the ICC revised the RCAF in 1986 such that the index and those
. .tariffs that implemented changes in the index would move down as
well as up, in accordance with changes in costs .

l

I

I

The second problem, the productivity issue, has been the
subject of a controversy that began in 1981.

As implemented by

the ICC, the RCAF would only measure changes in the prices railroads
pay for goods and services, and not actual costs including
productivity.

For example, the railroads today employ half as many

workers while moving the same volume of freight as they did in 1980,
but average annual wage rates have increased by 87% during the same
period . The RCAF, as currently implemented, reflects the 87%
increase in wage rates but not the 50% reduction in work force.
After a 1982 court order, two rounds of administrative rulemaking,
the report of the Railroad Accounting Principles Board (see
discussion below) and receipt of an independent consultant's report,

L

49

the ICC finally proposed in November 1987 to include a productivity
adjustment to the RCAF.

A number of technical and subsidiary policy

issues are incl uded in the rulemaking, but the ICC did recently
complete the rulemaking.

The public won on this issue and railroads

must now adjust for product ivity when calculating the RCAF.
Competitive Access

Shippers have focused their complaints about the ICC on the
so-cal l ed "competitive access" issues.

These issues concern several

long-standing, traditional railroad industry practices known as
joint rates, reciprocal switching and terminal trackage rights.

In

all these cases, one railroad which controls service at the point of
origin or destination agrees to allow another rai lroad to provide
competitive service over the portions of the route that both
carriers serve.

In the previously regulated scheme, where rates

were effectively equalized between points, these arrangements were
quite common .
Since 1980, railroads have cancelled hundreds of thousands of
such arrangements , signifi cantly diminishing the number of
competitive choices available to shippers.

Railroads argue that

they are merely streamlining the rail system and eliminating
circuitous and inefficient routings.

However , the General

Accounting Office has identified anticompetitive motivations behind
many such cancellations, and Judge Richard Posner of the United

...
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States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has criticized the
ICC's reliance upon mere economic theory in allowing such
cancellations to take place without adequate regulatory scrutiny.
The negotiations with the railroad industry in general, and the
CSX and Union Pacific rai lroads in particular, revealed that the
railroads view the competitive access issues as being very important
to them.

Nonetheless, Congress did give the ICC enhanced authority

in the Staggers Rail Act to promote railroad-to-railroad
competition.

The ICC can, under its existing authority, improve

competitive alternatives to some shippers and, therefore, let the
marketplace rather than regulators govern transportation
arrangements for those shippers.

By withholding access from their

competition, railroads can raise prices and even discriminate
between shippers, or show favoritism to industries or regions which
help them economically or politicall y.
Revenue Adequacy

The Interstate Commerce Act directs the ICC to generally assist
rail carriers in achieving "revenue adequacy," which is defined by
law as earni ng sufficient revenues to cover all fixed and variable
costs and a reasonable profit.

The concept of "revenue adequacy"

was introduced in 1976 by the 4R Act and since then railroads and
their customers have feuded almost continuously before the ICC on
how revenue adequacy should be measured.

After the passage of the
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Staggers Act, the ICC revised its revenue adequacy test even though
the relevant law was not changed.

This revised test broke away from

long settled concepts and experience used in state utility
regulatory agencies, and was virtually unique in regulatory law.

As

a direct result, the ICC then found virtually no major railroad to
be revenue adequate - a finding repeated every year since the
adoption of the revised test.
As cash-rich railroads continued to acquire each other, their
truck and barge competitors , and numerous diversified investments
such as oil and gas properties and resorts, and as f ormer
Transportation Secretary Elizabeth Dole urged Congress to sell
Conrail to the "highly profitable Norfolk Southern, the ICC's
11

annual findings that all railroads were severely "revenue
inadequate" became increasingly indefensible .

Finally, at Senate

hearings in February 1986, several weeks after a si ngularly
un successful defense of the revenue adequacy test in House hearings,
ICC Chairman Gradison conceded that the test was badly flawed and
did not accuratel y reflect the railroads' financial health.
Shortly thereafter , the Commission formally proposed to make
several far-reaching changes to more closely align its revenue
adequacy test to settled regulatory principles.

However, after ICC

reform l egislation fail ed by one vote in the House Energy and
Commerce Committee in September 1986, the Commission reversed course
and adopted just one significant change.
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In the years immediately following passage of the Staggers Act,
numerous ICC rulemaking and rate case decisions favoring the
railroads were premised on the Commission's perception {based on the
test it subsequently conceded to be flawed) that the railroad
industry was revenue inadequate.

More recently, the ICC has

de-emphasized the concept of revenue adequacy in its decision
making, while acknowledging that railroad revenue adequacy remains
an important policy goal.
The de-emphasis of revenue adequacy has diminished shipper
interest in all but one facet of the revenue adequacy test.

In its

1986 revi sions , the ICC directed the railroads to convert to
depreciat ion accounting for their track structures and said it would
permit railroads to "write-up" certain assets already expensed under
the previous accounting system.

According to the Railroad

Accounting Principle s Board (RAPB), whi ch is discussed in greater
detail below, thi s change may have added as much as $7 billion to
railroad invest ment base.

This investment base will s ignifi cantly

di stort for a number of years the picture of railroad revenue
adequacy . Although the RAPB's Final Report urged the ICC to
reconsider this i ssue, the agency has refused to do so.
Railroad Accounting Principles Board

The ICC' s regulatory responsibilities require it to maintain a
substantial involvement in many detailed accounting is sues.

The
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variety and complexity of these issues put them far beyond the reach
of a policy level discussion, but there is no question that these
accounting issues can and do substantially affect the outcome of the
policy issues.

Recognizing this importance, the Staggers Act

created the Railroad Accounting Principles Board (RAPB} to study the
ICC's accounting functions and issue accounting principles, which
the agency is obligated by law to adopt.

Congress failed to provide

funding for the RAPB for several years, however, the Board's Final
Report was not issued until September 1987.
As it was finally constituted, the Board consisted of
representatives from the ICC's competing constituent communities and
ac~ounting experts, and was chaired by the Comptroller General.

The

Board and its Final Report were virtually unanimously perceived as
being impartial, unbiased, and firmly grounded in sound accounting
as opposed to regulatory or policy premises.

Some of the Board's

significant regulatory recommendations are disputed by the
railroads, including its recommendation that the ICC include a
productivity adjustment to the Rail Cost Adjustment Factor and its
recommendation that the ICC revisit the revenue adequacy "double
write-up" issue discussed previously .

Nonetheless, the Board's

Report and its general accounting principles remain touchstones of
impartiality in an otherwise often contentious arena.
Ni nety- ni nt h Congress {1985-1986)
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The Consumer Rail Equity Act was first introduced in the Senate
and House in February 1985.

This legislation, which was referred to

the Senate Commerce Committee and the House Energy and Commerce
Committee, contained the reforms sought by the captive shippers.
Hearings were held in 1985 and 1986 in two subcommittees of the
House Energy and Commerce Committee.

The primary House proponents

of the legislation were Representatives Billy Tauzin (0-LA), Hal
Rogers (R-KY), Nick Rahall (0-WV}, and Tom Tauke (R-IA).

The ICC

reforms were added to the Conrail Privatization Act of 1986 in
subcommittee and were stripped from the bill in full committee the
next day by a one-vote margin.

Several Republican members of the

c~mmittee, including one co-sponsor, voted against the reforms under
very heavy lobbying from the Administration to report a "clean"
Conrail bi 11 .
Hearings were held in the Senate Commerce Committee in both
1985 and 1986.

The primary proponents were Senators Russell Long

(0- LA), Mark Andrews (R-ND), Wendell Ford (0-KY), Ted Stevens
(R-AK), and John D. Rockefeller, IV (0-WV).

Chairman John Danforth

(R-MO) refused to allow a markup on the legislation during the 99th
Congress .
One Hundredth Congress {1987-1988)

During the fall of 1986, following the September defeat in the
House Energy and Commerce Committee, captive shippers seriously
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considered dropping the legislative effort.

The members of the

House Committee were pressuring the ICC for reforms and the ICC had
promised reforms in a number of pending matters.

However, between

October 1986 and January 1987, the ICC issued a series of decisions
that indicated that the promised reforms were not to be.

Captive

shippers recommitted themselves to legislative action.
Hearings were held i n the Transportation Subcommittee of the
House Energy and Commerce Committee during the first six months of
1987.

The major House proponents were now Representatives Rick

Boucher (D-VA), Tom Tauke (R- IA), Billy Tauzin (D-LA), Michael
Bilirakis (R-FL), Hal Rogers (R-KY), and Nick Rahall (D-WV) .
Following the hearings, Subcommittee Chairman Tom Luken (D-OH)
instituted a process of negotiation between the shippers and
railroad that produced no consensus.

Chairman Luken then proposed a

compromise ICC reform bill that was reported by the subcommittee on
November 5, 1987 by a vote of 9-6 . The legislation was never
considered by the full House Energy and Commerce Committee, where it
enjoyed the support of Chairman John Dingell (D-MI).
Hearings were completed in the Transportation Subcommittee of
the Senate Commerce Committee during the first six months of 1987.
The major proponents of reform in the Committee were Senators John
D. Rockefeller , IV (D-WV), Ted Stevens (R-AK), and Brock Adams
(D-WA).

After the Hearings, there followed a long period of

negotiation between the shippers and railroads; Senators
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Rockefeller, Stevens, Adams and their colleagues; and, finally,
several chief executive officers of railroads and shipper companies.
These efforts resulted in Senators Rockefeller, Stevens, Adams
and Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS) submitting compromise legislation to the
Senate Commerce Committee in September 1988.

The compromise was

defeated by a vote of 10-9 on September 20, 1988, with the
assistance of the active opposition of the Administration, the full
Committee chairman and Subcommittee Chairman and the ranking
minority members of the full Committee and Subcommittee.

The margin

of error was again provided when a co- sponsor was prevailed upon by
' the Administration to vote against the legislation .

Following the

vote, a bipartisan group of 14 of the 20 Committee members wrote a
letter to the Commission warning that the Commission must reform its
practices or face Congressional action in 1989 .
The Admi nistration

The Reagan Administration strongly supported partial
deregulation of the railroads and consistently advocated the
complete deregulation of the motor carrier, household goods,
freight forwarder, bus, and inland water transportation
industries and termination of the ICC . Under this
Administration's plan, ICC rail activities would be transferred
to the Department of Transportation and rail antitrust matters
would be policed by the Department of Justice.

The handl ing of
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consumer protection complaints regarding household goods movers
would be administered by the Federal Trade Commission.

Labor has

opposed the further efforts at deregulation by the Bush
Administration, and Congress has never seriously considered
legislation to abolish the ICC .

President Bush has said very

little about further transportation deregulation.

The President,

however, chaired the Reagan Administration's Task Force on
Regulatory Reform and has generally been sympathetic to many of the
initiatives proposed by the Reagan Administration.

In general, the

President is in favor of greater competition and lessening of
regulation where it is possible to do so.
It would seem that without the abolishment of the ICC or
stronger Congressional action, the Interstate Commerce Commission
will continue to ignore its responsibilities to the public as so
clearly stated in the Staggers Act.

It would also seem that for

some reason members of the Interstate Commerce Commission believe
they understand the issues better than Congress did when they agreed
to enact Staggers.

I
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Leveraged Rai lroads

1989 Resul ts In Brief
(Expressed as a Percentage of Gross Revenue)

ATSF

100.0

100.0

100.0a

100 . 0

92.1

93.2

84.4

101.0

Operating income

7. 9

6.8

25 . 6a

(1.0)

Other income

4.3

6. 6

1.9

12.6

Fixed charges

0.3

12 .8

15.0

5.5

Pretax margin

11. 9

0.6

Gross
Operating expenses

2.Sa

6 .1

aThrough a purchase accounting adjustment, depreciation
charges equal to about seven percentage points of
revenue were magically eli minated; cash flow did not
change. Without this "adjustment," a l oss equal to
babout 4. 5% of gross would have been reported.
Rough consolidation from statutory reports; known
intercompany items eliminated . No consolidated
figures available (Grants.II).

Chapter IV
RESULTS

The data introduced in previous chapters have shown that
railroad deregulation has had a profound effect on the availability
and cost of rail service in this country as well as the economic
well - being of the railroads themselves.

The railroads were too

regulated , but now under deregulation, the railroads may have too
much freedom without the Interstate Commerce Commission's
involvement.

This involvement was expected by Congress in the

'forming of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980.
The rail industry in this country is comparable to a utility in
the sense that each and everyone of us depend on the rails for
movement of commerce .

If, and when, rail service is lost to a

community or geographi c area, the producers and consumers of that
community have to depend on alternate modes for the movement of
goods.

Obviously, air is more expensive than rail and in most

cases, so is truck . Therefore, the cost of everything you consume
as well as what you produce, increases as transportation cost
increase.
If you are a consumer you do without, substitute, or go ahead
and pay the higher price.
cal l ed inflation.

When you pay the higher price, it is

If you are a producer, you have to raise prices
59
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to recoup the increased cost of transportation.

The problem with

this is you may lose the sale if you raise your price if your
competitor's distribution mode (foreign or domestic) has not been
affected by increased cost.
people off.

When you lose enough sales, you lay

When people get laid off, they cannot pay their bills

nor are they consumers to the degree they were in the past.
causes a ripple effect throughout the economy.

This

If unemployment is

high and, therefore, disposable income is low, people stop buying.
This causes more jobs to be lost and the cycle starts all over
again.
Railroads raising reciprocal switching charges (the charges one
railroad charges another) or raising freight rates because of lack
of competition, or closing an industry (effectively closing out your
competition by refusing to switch your competition's freight) is not
going to cause the demise of our economy, but it does have profound
effects on those who are victimized by such actions.
Examples of actions which cause problems are those which
parallel the actions of the Southern Pacific Railroad to raise
reciprocal switching charges to $460 per car; or actions of Conrail
to close all routes with competing carriers , forcing people to ship
over their railroad; or the CSX Railroad not allowing a competing
railroad to haul traffic into an industry which they serve.

This is

not intended to pick on any of these companies by naming them
specifically, because all the ra ilroads are guilty of these actions,
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not just the ones named.
In Chapter Two, we saw some of the results of rai lroad
deregulation.

We reviewed the comments of various groups of people,

companies, and industries that oppose deregulation and some who
support it.

The data presented in this chapter will show that

railroad deregulation is additionally causing financial chaos in the
rail industry itself.
Railroad Debt

Rai lroads typically have not fared very well economical l y.
Debt-laden railroads are struggl ing again, and why shouldn't t hey?
The average railroad is the photographic negative of the model
debtor.

Railroads are cyclical, capital-intens i ve and still

somewhat regul ated.

They are characterized by low margins and high,

fixed operating costs .

Furthermore, there is onl y so much that a

railroad can do to manage its way out of trouble.

Business

conditions, the flow of traffic, and the level of rates are beyond
its control.

Labor and raw materials are not a meaningful part of

the total value of its finished product .

You cannot push a button,

or shut down a production line and thereby slash costs.

Braking the

cost on a railroad is a l ittle like attempting to stop a speeding
locomotive.
Capitalization and Reorganization
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The cycle of railroad capitali zation and reorganization i s
almost as old as the iron horse itself .

In the 15 years up until

1899, for instance, 521 American ra ilroads fell into receivership.
The bankrupt lines were capitalized to the tune of $5 billion, about
equally divided between stocks and bonds, a colossal sum for that
day.

When the railroads were not overexpanding or overborrowing,

they were debating with the Interstate Commerce Commission over an
adequate rate of return.

"One fact you learn in ranching," a

Wyoming man told writer Ian Frazier, "i s that things have a tendency
to die."

Debt-bound railroads have a tendency to fail (Grants 6).

If J. P. Morgan could overburden the New Haven Railroad in a
time of low-interest rates and more or less sane, financial
practices, the odds are overwhelming that rai lroads could
overburden themselves with debt today.
During the fall of 1990, Grant's reviewed the new CNW junk
bonds prospectus.

The bonds - $475 million's worth of 14 1/4

percent senior notes at par, due in 2001 - came to market, albeit at
a higher yield than the issuer had hoped.

The bid price was 90 ,

having sunk into the 80's.
An unidentified railroad consultant states:
Even in a time of nominal prosperity, leveraged railroads
have been laboring.
It is a cinch they will labor harder in any future
business downturn, as they are capitalized for prosperity.
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Railroad financial results, in general, turned down in the
second half of 1989.
The Southern Pacific is suffering from cash-flow problems
and may be the weakest sister of the lot .
The CNW is falling short of bullish expectations, its
success in reducing its operating expenses
notwithstanding.

Of the five Western rai lroads tracked by

The Journal of Commerce for monthl y changes in traffic,
only the Chicago and North Western reported a decline for
the four weeks ending March 3, 1990.
,

What the financial engineers of the 1980's did not know is that

railroading is the most complex and difficult service business in
the world.

A railroad is selling a perishable commodity, space in

time, which is moving.

If that space is not sold, the cost is

incurred, but no revenue results.
Typical Railroad Income Statement

Revenues

100%

Expense

89.7%

Gross Margin

10.3%

Other Income

4.5%

Fixed Charges

(3.4%)

Pretax Net Income

11. 3 (Grants 10)

"In the first half of 1989, the gross margin and pretax net was
slightly higher, up one point, or 10 percent.

In the second half
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results were considerably worse, and the full-year percentages are
expected to be below the year 1987, which was in the middle of
recent full-year outcomes (1988 and 1984 better; 1983, 1986, worse)"
(Grants 7) .
Putting this in context, the recent experience is the best that
one can reasonably expect for a coupl e of reasons.
at the end of a long uptrend in the economy.

We are probably

The industry has

downsized severel y, so that current expenses reflect major personnel
cuts and branch-line sales or abandonments.

Diesel-fuel prices were

at a low point in 1987-88, and seem unlikely to fall lower.

There

is again serious talk of increasing load limits for truckers and
some major waterway bottlenecks are being eliminated.

Further, rain

on the headwaters of the Mississippi/Missouri system in 1990
relieved a three-year drought that had helped rail rates and volume.
"If there is not much upside, what happens on the
downside? To hang on to volume, railroads always cut
rates. Even if the business is protected by a contract,
the rate structure is not commercially enforceable if a
cheaper alternative is offered. Expenses do not go down,
at the same volume level, and overheads are so smal l in
relati on to total expense that no amount of belttightening will have a meaningful effect on the bottom
line. Consequently, the cuts in price (i.e. rates) made
to hold volume come directly through to profitability. A
cut of 5 percent in average rates in such a situation will
reduce pretax net by nearly 50 percent" (Grants 11).
According to The Journal of Commerce, Congress is almost
certain to give the Interstate Commerce Commission more power to
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review leveraged buy-outs of railroads.
The House is expected to consider a House-Senate compromise
version of a bill that gives the ICC greater authority to examine
railroad sales financed with borrowed funds.
Congressional approval would mark a political defeat for the
railroad industry because several major rail lines oppose the
leveraged buy- out review plan.

Under current law, the ICC must

approve the acquisition of one railroad by another.

Pending bill

provisions would extend that authority by ordering the commission to
approve the purchase of a major railroad by an individual or company
' that does not currently own one.

Several issues must be addressed

in the ICC review, including the amount of fi xed charges resulting
from the transaction and the railroad's ability to cover debt
payments using cash flow and other accepted measures.
According to an article in Traffic World, leveraged buy-outs
are occurring with greater frequency than ever in transportation.
Some examples of LBO activity include:
CNW Corporation, parent of Ch icago and North Western
Transportation Company, was taken over by Blackstone
Capital Partners, an investor group including CNW
management . Total debt load:

$1 .3 billion , twice what

is was before the transaction.
Illinois Central Transportation Company, parent of the
Illinois Central Railroad Company, was bought out by
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Rail Acquisition, Incorporated, a subsidiary of the
Prospect Group, Incorporated; total price:

$434 million,

which included more than $5 million to Merrill Lynch
Capital Markets, which arranged the transaction.

During

1990 , another LBO was launched making the railroad a

separate and distinct company (Illinois Central Railroad) .
Union Pacific Corporation underwent an internal
restructuring which had the same conceptual impact as
a LBO.
, Analysis

In short, for leveraged railroads, nothing less than prosperity
will do.

The new- era enthus iasts will say, "We can always sell

assets," or, "we have this excess real estate . " It would be nice to
be able to sell one's real estate, but in a bear market it is not
always possible to get the market price.
As we can deduce from the data submitted in this chapter and
Chapter II , there are serious factors affecting the future of
American Railroads and the industry they serve under the current
regulation.

The only choice railroads may have left to them will be

to renew whatever practice that will increase revenues.

Chapter V

DISCUSSION

The public has been blinded to the real effects of railroad
deregulation by the popular cry and general concensus that freight
rates have gone down.

It is the author's belief that the recent

cost efficiencies of the railroads have been brought about primarily
by new, innovative , market-oriented , top management teams that have
brought the railroad industry out of the nineteenth century into the
beginning of the twenty- first century.
,

Admittedly, deregulation

has helped in this process but it was certainly not the cause of it.
As new abuses are allowed under deregulation , the cry will ring
out louder and louder for Congress, directly or through the
Interstate Commerce Commission, to re- regulate those areas where
economic abuses could be formulated . The areas where the public
needs economic regulation today to protect them are in the following
areas:
Reciprocal swi tching charges:

Do not allow a rail carrier

to charge more than 180% of variable cost or 150% of full
cost to the competing carrier.
Access to industries:

Open up all industry to allow for

access by all rail carriers through reci procal switching.
Joint routes/joint rates:
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Obligate carriers to join in
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such arrangements at the shippers request.
In addition, the railroads should be protected by insuring
against highly leveraged buyouts of rail companies .

Several

rai l roads have been acquired in recent years through highlyleveraged purchases . As shown in Chapter III , the Atchison, Topeka
and Santa Fe, CNW, Illinois Central and Southern Pacific rai l roads
are all examples of thi s.

A slight downturn i n the economy could

spell disaster for these railroads, making the government bail out
of Penn Central during the last decade seem small in comparison.
In the next few years, all of these questions will be addressed
and if we are smart enough to use our col lective clout, they wi l l be
corrected.

The Interstate Commerce Commission is already taking a

fresh look at things with the new Commissioner and Chairman, Edward
Phibin.

This, coupled wi th the efforts of The Consumers United for

Rail Equity (C.U.R.E . ), a group of shippers advocating re-regulation
and the National Industrial Traffic League (N.I .T.L.) , a shippers
group who acts as a watchdog against all carriers, gives us the
opportunity to make the profound changes cited in this work.
Since the beginning of regulation in 1887 when Congress passed
the act to regulate commerce, we have been inundated with cont i nuous
regulation.

Regul ation upon regulation was passed to protect the

public from the railroads.

The t emptations of the free market were

too numerous and the rewards so great that the rai l roads committed
abuse after abuse foll owed by regulation after regulation as shown
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in Appendix 8.
This cycle of abuse and regulation continued for 93 years until
the passage of the Staggers Act, which re-regulated or deregulated
(depending on one's point of view) the railroad industry.

Since

that time, controversy about the intentions of Congress in passing
the Act were continuing.

The views that were expressed at the 1985

oversight hearings on the Staggers Act before the surface
transportation subcommittee of the Senate committee on commerce,
science and transportation (page 29) are examples of the continuing
debate.

After many of the country's largest shippers and shippers

, groups lobbied unsuccessfully in these hearings to get the
Interstate Commerce Commission to enforce the shipper protection
parts of the Act, the shipping public have given less attention to
these issues and have focused more than ever on helping the
railroads to become more cost efficient.

Several initiatives have

come about in recent years .
The Elkins Act exemptions is one area where the railroads were
recently given an exemption by the Interstate Commerce Commission
from its regulations.

The Elkins Act exemptions permit railroads to

engage in certain industrial market development activities that were
previously classifi ed as rebates.

These exemptions were the result

of a joint proposal made in 1990 by the National Industrial
Transportation League and the Association of American Railroads (The
Notice 357).

This may be the vanguard of a new era of cooperation,
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or is it a Trojan horse?
The list of issues/bills pending before the House and Senate
this year has shrunk substantially over the past decade as
demonstrated by the following: (The Reporter Circular 91-36)
l~/Bi ll

House

Senate

~

Status

Status

Ending the
rail strike:
H.J. Res.

4/17

4/17

222

Development
of Maglev and
High Speed
Trains: H.R.
1087, H.R.
1452, H.R.
2941, s. 811

Signed into
law 4/18 as
Public Law
102-29

C0fl11lerce
ordered H.R.
1087 reported
11/8 CH.Rep.
102-297). Publ ic
Works has sequential referral
until 2/28. H.R.
2941 ordered
reported 11/7 CH.
Rep. 102- 417).
C0fl11le re e and
Public Works each
have sequenti al
refer ral llltil 3/6.
Issues also
incorporated into
H.R. 2950.

Reauthorization Incorporated into
of Short-Line
H.R. 2607
and Local Assis tance Programs:
H.R. 947, H.R.

Passed 10/22
(S. Rep. 102·
163). Issues

Chances of enactment are good.

also incorporated into
H.R. 2950.

Incorporated into
S. 1571

Chances of
enactment are
1.11certain.

Pending floor
consideration
(S. Rep. 102-

Chances of
enactment
are I ikely.

1425, S. 641 ,
1060

s.

Rail coal rates
Study: H.R. 776,
S. 1220

Favorably reported
by Co1111lerce•s
Energy Su.bcomnittee.
Pending ful 1
comnittee
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Issue/Bill

House

Senate

llultier

Status

Status

Reauthorization
of Federal Ra i l
Safety Programs:

Passed 9/23 (H.
Rep. 102·205)

Pending floor
cons ideration
(S. Rep. 102·

H.R. 2607, S.

~

Chances of
enactment are
good

219

1571

This small number of issues reflects the changing relationship
between railroads and shippers and has come about l argely because of
the public sharing of the benefits of deregulation.

The Brookings

Institute Study referred to in Chapter 2 (page 41) reported that
shi.ppers and their customers have saved $20 billion a year in
transportation costs since 1980 because of surface freight
deregulation, in part due to railroad deregulation.

The railroads'

gains have been largely in the arena of labor cost and efficiency.
The most recent labor reductions were noted as tax write-offs
announcements hit the financial newspapers this spring {Traffic
World 33) .

It was reported that the Norfolk Southern took a special

charge of $450 million .

The charge was for severence pay for an

unreported number of union employees.

The Southern Pacific reported

in the same article a $270 million special charge resulting from the
elimination of 700 train crewmen.

The Burlington Northern Rai l road

reported a special charge of $708 million for employee reductions,
environmental clean- up costs, and federal employee liability
association claims.
The railroad employees have seen work rule changes and train
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crew reductions take place while their unions stand by almost
powerless as the administration and Congress authorize presidential
emergency boards to mediate . These Boards were ultimately given
manditory arbitration powers.

The union members have been

disappointed by Congress and their rail labor leaders (Traffic World
34) .

It is almost like the focus of everyone has moved to l abor and

efficiency and away from abuse of the public as a way to rai se
revenues.

Will the railroads return to the public to increase

revenues? This remains to be seen.
Based on the research, it is hypothesized t hat total
deregulation of the Nation's freight-carrying railroads i s not in
the public' s best interest.

The Interstate Commerce Commission must

provide the economic protection that the Staggars Rail Act so
clearly empowers it to provide .
The research clearly supports this hypothesis by showing that
(1) the railroads can monopol ize economic transportation; (2) that
this monopoly can result in the uneconomic distribution of goods
which di srupts domestic and foreign commerce; (3) that given thi s
opportunity, railroads will take advantage; and (4) that the
Congress recognized this and to protect the public empowered the
Interstate Commerce Commission to control economic abuses .
Limitations

Collecting data f or this study was flawed primarily by the long
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history of the subject (100 years) and the vast amount of data
available on both sides of the issue.

Presenting the data in such a

quality way to be supporting of the hypothesis was extremely
difficult.
Suggestions for Future Research

It is recommended t hat a study of this type be compressed into
a tighter time frame for completion.

It is also recomended that the

subject be limited to a shorter period of history for study.

As an

example, this study could have been limited to the post Staggers
era.

APPENDIX A
MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE INTERSTATE Cotl4ERCE ACT

1.

All charges made for services by carriers subject to the act
must be reasonable and just. Every unjust and unreasonable
charge is prohibited and declared to be unlawful.

2.

The giving of any undue or unreasonable preference, as between
persons or localities, or kinds of traffic, or the subjecting
any one of them to undue or unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantage , is declared to be unlawful.

3.

Reasonable, proper and equal facilities for the interchange of
traffic between lines, and for the receiving, forwarding and
delivering of passengers and property between connecting lines
is required and discrimination in rates and charges as between
connecting lines is forbidden.

4.

It was made unlawful to charge or receive any greater
compensation in the aggregate for the transportation of
passengers or t he like kind of property under substantially
similar circumstances and conditions for a shorter than for a
longer distance over the same line in the same direction, the
shorter being included within the longer distance. (Note Since 1911, departures from this provision may be permitted by
the Commission.)

5.

Contracts, agreements or combinations for the pooling of
freight of different and competing railroads, or for dividing
between them the aggregate or net earnings of such rai l roads or
any portion thereof, are declared to be unlawful. (Note Since 1920, pooling may be permitted by permission of the
Commission .)

6.

All carriers subject to the law are required to print their
tariffs for the transportation of persons and property, and to
keep them open to public i nspection at every depot or station
on their roads.

7.

An advance in rates is not to be made until after ten days'
public notice , but a reduction in rates may be made to take
effect at once, the notice of the same being immediately and
publicly given. The rates publicly notified are to be the
maximum as wel l as the minimum charges which can be collected
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or received for the services, respectively, for which t hey
purport to be established. (Note-The Act now requires 30 days'
noti ce of all changes.)
8.

Copies of all tariffs are required to be fil ed with this
Commiss ion, whi ch i s al so to be promptly notified of all
changes that shall be made in the same . The joint tariffs of
connecting roads are also required to be filed , and al so copies
of all contract s, agreements or arrangements between carriers
in relation to traffic affected by the Act.

9.

It i s made unlawful f or any carrier to enter into any
combination, contract or agreement, expressed or implied, to
prevent, by changes of time schedules , carriage in different
cars, or by other means or dev i ces, the carriage of freight
from being continuous from the place of shipment to the place
of destination .

APPENDIX B
PARTIAL LISTING OF CASES AGAINST RAILROADS - 1887- 1980
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280 I.C.C. 1.
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Calif. Railroad Comm. v. Sou. Pac. R. Co.-264 U.S. 331.
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.APPENDIX C

ICC AUIBORITY TO SET LAWS

1.

In a matter related to a rail carrier providing transportation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce
Commission under this subchapter, the Commission shal l exempt a
person, class of persons, or a transaction or service when the
Commission finds that the application of a provision of this
subtitle:
a.

is not necessary to carry out the transportation policy
of Section 10101a of this title; and

b.

either (A) the transacti on or service is of limited
scope, or (B) the application of a provision of this
subtitle is not needed to protect shippers from the
abuse of ma rket power.

2.

The Commission may, where appropriate, beg in a proceeding under
this section on its own in iti ative or on application by the
Secretary of Transportation or an interested party.

3.

The commission may specify the period of time during which an
exemption granted under this section is effective .

4.

The Commission may revoke an exemption , to the extent it
specifies , when it finds that application of a provision of
this subtitle to the person, class, or transportation is not
necessary to carry out the transportation policy of Section
10101a of this title.

5.

No exemption order issued pursuant to this section shall
operate to relive any rail carrier from an obligation to
provide contractual terms for liability and claims which
are consistent with the provisions of Section 11707 of
this title. Nothing in this subsection of Section 11707
of this title shall prevent rail carriers from offering
alternative terms nor give the Commiss ion the authority to
require any specific level of rates or services based upon
the provisions of Section 11707 of this title.

6.

The Commission may exercise its authority under this section to
exempt transportation that is provided by a rail carrier as a
part of the continuous intermodal movement.
86
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7.

,

.

The Commission may not exercise its
section (1) to authorize intermodal
prohibited by this title, or (2) to
obligation to protect the interests
this subtitl e.

authority under this
ownership that is otherwise
relieve a carrier of its
of empl oyees as required by

APPENDIX D
PREVENTING ABUSES OF HIGH RATES

1.

A rate cannot be challenged as unreasonably high unless it
exceeds the threshold set out in Section 10709(d).(l)

2.

The Commission has no jurisdiction unless it finds that the
railroad has "market dominance" over the transportation to
which the rate applies (Section 10709).(2)

3.

Under Section 229 of the Staggers Rail Act, all rail rates in
effect on October 1, 1980, the effective date of the Staggers
Rail Act, wh ich were not challenged during the 180- day period
beginning on such effect ive date, or were not found as the
result of such a challenge to be unreasonable, are conclusively
presumed reasonable.

4.

Rail rate increases are also immune from challenge so long as
they are within the limits set forth in Section 10707a(3).

,_

In addition, the reasonableness of a rate may not be challenged
if it is established by contract filed with the Commission.
a. Threshold is defined as 180 percent of revenue/variable
cost.
b. Defined as an absence of effective competition from other
carriers or modes of transportation.
c. Rate increase cannot raise rates to a level more than 190
percent of revenue /variable cost.
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APPENDIX E
RAILROAD UNIFICATIONS, 1957 TO PRESENT

,~

Effctve
Date of
Unifction

Type of
Unifction

08/31/57

Merger

01/01/58

Merger

Nashville, Chattanooga
& St. Louis
Litchfield & Madison

10/06/58
12/01/59
01/28/60

Control
Merger
Control

Spokane International
Virginian
Toledo, Peoria & Western

01/01/60

Merger

07/01/60

Merger

10/17/60

Merger

11/01/60

Merger

Charleston & Western
Carolina
Missouri- Kansas-Texas
of Texas
Erie & Delaware,
Lackawanna & Western
Minneapolis & St. Louis

01/01/61

Merger

10/31/61
05/17/62

Merger
Control

Minneapolis, St. Paul &
Sault Ste. Marie, Duluth,
South Shore & Atlantic
and Wisconsin Central
Texas & New Orleans
Lehigh Valley

02/04/63
06/18/63
07/01 /63
09/03/63

Control
Control
Control
Control

Baltimore & Ohio
Cientral of Georgia
Georgia & Florida
Ann Arbor

01/01 /64

Merger

09/25/64
10/16/64

Control
Control

St. Louis, San Francisco
and Texas
Kansas-Oklahoma and Gulf
New York, Chicago and

Applicant
Railroads
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Controlling
Railroad/
Company

Louisville &
Nashville
Chicago &
North Western
Union Pacific
Norfolk & Western
Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe and
Pennsylvania
Atlantic Coast Line
Missouri-KansasTexas
Erie-Lackawanna
Chicago and North
Western
Soo Line

Southern Pacific
Pennsylvania
Railroad
Chesapeake & Ohio
Southern
Southern
Detroit, Toledo &
Ironton
St. Louis-San
Francisco
Texas & Pacific
Norfolk & Western
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Effctve
Date of

,_

Controlling

Unifction

Type of
Unifction

10/16/64
08/01/65

Merger
Merger

08/12/65
01/03/67

Merger
Control

05/21/67
07/01/67

Control
Merger

02/01/68

Merger

03/29/68

Control

St. Louis
Akron, Canton & Youngstown
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe
and Panhandle & Santa Fe
Pacific Electric
Chicago, South Shore
and South Bend
Chicago & Eastern Illinois
Atlantic Coast Line,
Seaboard Air Line
Pennsylvania Railroad,
New York Central
Western Maryland

04/01/68
07/01 /68

Control
Merger

Erie-Lackawanna
Chicago Great Western

07/01/68

Control

Delaware & Hudson

08/01/68

Control

Alton & Southern

01 /31/69
02/01/69

Merger
Merger

07/01/69
03/02/70

Merger
Merger

04/01 /70
05/31/71

Merger
Merger

07/31/71

Merger

New Orleans & Northeastern
Penn Central and New York,
New Haven & Hartford
Piedmont & Northern
Great Northern, Northern
Pacific and Chicago,
Burlington and Quincy
Kansas, Oklahoma & Gulf
Central of Georgia,
Georgia and Florida,
Savannah & Atlanta
& Wrightsville & Tenille
Monon

08/10/72

Merger

Illinois Central & Gulf

Applicant
Railroads

Railroad/
Company

Norfolk & Western
Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe
Southern Pacific
Chesapeake & Ohio
Missouri Pacific
Seaboard Coast Line
Penn Central
Chesapeake & Ohio
and Baltimore & Ohio
Norfolk & Western
Chicago & North
Western
Norfolk & Western
Missouri Pacific and
Chicago and North
Western
Alabama Great
Southern
Seaboard Coast Line
Burlington Northern

Texas & Pacific
Central of Georgia

Louisville and
Nashville
Illinois Central Gulf
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,_

Effctve
Date of
Unifction

Type of
Unifction

06/15/73

Consolidation

01/01/74
04/01/76

Merger
Consolidation

10/16176

Merger

11/01/78

Merger

11/10/78
06/24/80

Control
Control

11/01/80

Consolidation

11/21/80

Merger

04/13/81

Control

06/16/81

Control

01/01/82

Merger

Applicant
Railroads
Mobile & Ohio
Baltimore & Ohio,
Chesapeake & Ohio
and Western Maryland
Carolina & North Western
Central Railroad of New
Jersey, Erie-Lackawanna,
Lehigh & Hudson River,
Lehigh Valley, Penn
Central , Reading and
Ann Arbor
Texas & Pacific and
Chicago and Eastern
Illinois
Abiliene & Southern ,
Fort Worth Belt, MissouriIllinois, New Orleans &
Lower Coast, St. Joseph
Belt, Texas-New Mexico
and Union Terminal
Green Bay & Western
Grand Trunk Western
and Detroit, Toledo and
Ironton
Chessie System and
Family Lines
Bu rlington Northern and
St. Louis-San Francisco
Grand Trunk Western
and Detroit and Toledo
Shore Line
Maine Central

Burlington Northern,
Colorado and Southern ,
Fort Worth & Denver,

Controlling
Railroad/
Company

Chessie System

Norfolk & Western
Consolidated Rail
Corporation

Missouri Pacific

Missouri Pacific

Itel Corporation
Grand Trunk Western

CSX Corporation
Burlington Northern
Grand Trunk Western

Guilford
Transportation
Industries
Burlington Northern
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Effctve
Date of
Unifction

,~

Type of
Unifction

Applicant
Railroads

06/01/82

Consolidation

12/22/82

Merger

01/01/83

Consolidation

07/01/83

Control

Burlington Northern
(Oregon-Washington) and
Walla Walla Valley
Southern and Norfolk
and Western
Union Pacific, Missouri
Pacific and Western
Pacific
Family Lines and
Louisville and Nashville
Boston & Maine

01/05/84

Control

Delaware & Hudson

02/19/85

Control

03/26/87

Control

08/12/88

Merger

10/13/88

Control

Soo Line and Chicago,
Milwaukee St. Paul
and Pacific
Conrail - 850/o
Government Control
Missouri-Kansas-Texas
and Union Pacific
Southern Pacific
Transportation Company

Source: Milling & Baking News, Kansas City, April 24, 1990

Controlling
Railroad/
Company

Norfolk Southern
Corporation
Union Pacific
Corporation
Seaboard System
Guilford
Transportation
Guilford
Transportation
Soo Line

Conrail - Private
Sector
Union Pacific
Rio Grande
Industries

APPENDIX F
PROFILE OF THE RAIL INDUSTRY BY TYPE OF RAILROAD

Type of
Railroad

Number

Mil es

Employees

Revenue ($000)

Class I

18

147,568

235 , 814

25,802,885

Regional

27

15,100

10,927

966,050

285

14 , 534

6,536

666,238

172

4,011

9.217

622,153

502

181,213

262,494

28,057,326

2

Local
Linehaul
Switching t
Terminal

TOTAL
,

.

Cl ass I

4%

Regional

82%

90%

92%

5

8

4

4

57

8

2

2

_]_1

_2

_j

_2

100%

100%

100%

100%

Local
Li nehaul
Switching &
Terminal

TOTAL

1
1.tiile identif ied separately herein, Switching and Terminal railroads are

considered to be Local railroads.
2
Revenue for some Regional and Local railroads has been estimated.

Source: Transportation Deregulation \Jhat's Regulated and ~hat Isn't.
Kalisa and Cutler. ~ashington, DC 1986.
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APPENDIX G

AVERAGE SIZE: CLASS I, REGIONAL AND LOCAL RAILROADS

of
Railroad

Type

Cl ass I

Annual Revenue ($000)
L,ow
High
Average

Miles of Road Operat ed
High low Average

4,501,891

78,685

1, 403,995

Regional

82,365

3,200

31,530

Local
Li ne-haul
Switching &
Terminal

38,653

7

2,299

342

1

51

42 , 921

1

3,695

217

1

23

23,476

487

8,198

1,969 113

559

,_
Source: Transportation Deregulation I/hat's Regulated and What Isn't .
Kalisa and Cutler. Washington, DC 1986.
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APPEll>IX H

STATE DISTRIBUTION Of RAILROM>S

State

R~ional

Indiana

4
11
5
7
7

3
5
3
1
1

California
Ohio
Arkansas
North Carolina
Missouri

4
4
5
2
11

& Ter-.inal

Total

25
8
18
16
10

23
18
10

55
42

9

33

14

32

0
2
0
1
1

16
10
18
18
3

10
11
2
4

9

30
27
25
25
24

6
7
5
6
6

1
3
2
1
3

14
6
13
11
7

2
6
2
3
4

22
22
21
20

2
8
3
4
6

1
1
0

14
6

2
3
6
3
2

19
18
18
17
17

lo'iscons in

9
2
3
2
3

16
16
15
14
14

Colorado
Florida
lo'ash ington
Virginia
lo'est Virginia

4
4
2
4
3

Maryland
Massachusetts
New Hmrpshire
Nebraska
Vermont

Pennsylvania
ill inois
New York
Texas

Tennessee
Iowa
Mississippi

Oklahana
'

SWitchire
~

Michigan

Georgia
Louisiana
Oregon
Alabama

Kentucky
Kansas

South Carolina
Minnesota
New Jersey

.b!E!!

36

23

1

9
9

1

8

2
1
4
1
2

8
6
3
7

4
5
2
8
2

1
2

6
7
7
4

2
1
3
3

0

9

1

13

4
2
1

0
2
2

4

5

1
1

3
5
6
0
6

2
4
1

11
11
11
10
9

1
1

3

0
0
1
1
1

8
7
6
6
6

0
0
0
0

5
5

1

1

1

1

South Dakota
Montana
Connecticut
Delaware

3
2
2

2

1

0

Maine

1

2

3
2

Utah
Arizona
Idaho
New Mex ico
lo'yoming

3

5

0
0
1
0

0

3

0

2

3

1
2

4

2
4
2

95

2

,

13

13
13
13

6

5

5
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State
North Dakota
\lash i ngton, DC
Alaska
Nevada
Rhode Island

Source:

Class I
2
4
0
1
0

Regicnal

2
0

,
,
0

Local
0
0
1
0
0

& Terminal

0
0
0
0
0

Transportation Deregulation \/hat's Regulated and \Jhat Isn't.
\Jashington, DC 1986.

Kai isa and Cutler.

Total
4
4
2
1
1
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